ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ
By Nick Stamatakis
Before the first strike was launched, before the missiles flew and the region edged toward wider war, America’s top intelligence and military officials delivered assessments that were far more cautious than the public rhetoric that followed.
In March 2025, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified before Congress that the U.S. Intelligence Community “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon,” and that Iran’s supreme leader had not authorized a revived nuclear weapons program. That judgment was consistent with longstanding U.S. intelligence findings: Iran may enrich uranium and expand its technical capacity, but there was no evidence of an active bomb program.
President Donald Trump publicly dismissed that assessment, saying she was “wrong.” Gabbard later clarified that while Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile had reached unprecedented levels, and while Tehran could theoretically assemble a weapon within months if it chose to do so, U.S. intelligence did not assess that such a decision had been made.
At the same time, Pentagon officials were delivering equally sobering briefings behind closed doors. According to multiple news reports, congressional staff were told there was no intelligence showing Iran was preparing to launch a first strike against U.S. forces or the United States. Iran’s missiles and proxy forces were described as an ongoing threat posture — but not an imminent attack.
Official Portrait of the 22nd Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Dan Caine. (DOD Photo by Benjamin Applebaum)Meanwhile, reporting by The Washington Post revealed that Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned the President that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities carried “acute risks.” He reportedly cited depleted precision munitions stockpiles, limited allied support, operational complexity, and the potential for American casualties. In other words, the nation’s top military officer did exactly what his role requires: he laid out the risks plainly.
Taken together, these assessments paint a stark picture. The intelligence chief testified that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. Pentagon briefers said there was no evidence of an imminent Iranian first strike. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs warned the operation would be dangerous and fraught with uncertainty.
Yet the strike went forward.
This is where the story shifts from intelligence to accountability.
In Washington, senior officials are acutely aware that wars can unravel quickly. Casualties mount. Costs escalate. Political winds shift. When that happens, blame follows. Under those conditions, institutional self-preservation becomes a powerful force. By testifying under oath that Iran was not building a bomb, by briefing Congress that no first strike was imminent, and by warning the President of operational dangers, America’s top national security professionals created a record.
That record matters.
If the conflict widens or the initial justifications fail to hold up, the intelligence community and military leadership can point to their documented assessments. They can say: we presented the evidence as we saw it; we warned of the risks; the decision was civilian and political.
Some will argue that this is simply how civil-military relations are supposed to work. The military advises; elected leaders decide. That is true. But when public messaging emphasizes urgency and existential threat, while internal assessments emphasize uncertainty and caution, the gap becomes more than a procedural one. It becomes political.
This is not about whether Iran poses challenges. It does. It is not about whether enrichment levels are concerning. They are. It is about whether the case presented to the public reflected the best professional judgments available at the time — or whether those judgments were sidelined in favor of a more dramatic narrative.
The most striking feature of this episode is not that disagreements occurred. It is that the cautionary voices — the spies who said no bomb, the generals who said high risk — were publicly contradicted or minimized, even as their private assessments were carefully preserved.
In the aftermath of force, that preservation looks less like a routine procedure and more like institutional self-protection. Call it prudence. Call it “cover your behind.” Either way, it underscores a timeless lesson: when the rhetoric of inevitability outruns the evidence, history tends to remember who warned, and who pressed ahead anyway.
The American people have already made up their mimnd in dirst-seen numbers: 80% reject the war against Iran and, come November there will be hell to be at the elections…
March 2, 2026, n.stamatakis@aol.com www.helleniscope.com
DISCLAIMER: The views and statements expressed in this article constitute constitutionally protected opinions of this author.
It amazes my simple mind that nations that have nuclear bombs struck Iran. Who is the Satan? Who chants death to Iran?
“Taken together, these assessments paint a stark picture. The intelligence chief testified that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. Pentagon briefers said there was no evidence of an imminent Iranian first strike. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs warned the operation would be dangerous and fraught with uncertainty.
Yet the strike went forward.”
Tulsi should resign in protest. If she does not, her credibility will be in danger.
Regrettably, I believe you may be right.
Consider the 1919 alternatives:
1. The Hussein–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916)
This was the most important alternative to Sykes–Picot because it promised something very different:
A large, unified Arab kingdom under Sharif Hussein of Mecca.
The territory envisioned included most Arab-majority lands of the Ottoman Empire, except for explicitly excluded coastal Syria.
This plan conflicted directly with Sykes–Picot’s division of the same lands into British and French zones.
Although not a formal map-based partition, it represented a competing vision of Arab independence, not European spheres of influence.
2. The Constantinople Agreement (1915)
Before Sykes–Picot, the Allies had already agreed to:
Give Russia control of Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Turkish Straits.
Britain and France would receive adjustments elsewhere in the Middle East.
This plan assumed a complete dismantling of the Ottoman state and would have radically altered the map had Russia not withdrawn from the war after 1917.
3. The Balkan and Armenian Proposals
Several proposals—some Allied, some from nationalist groups—imagined:
An independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia.
Expanded Balkan states (Greece, Serbia) taking Aegean and Thracian territories.
These ideas circulated among diplomats and nationalist groups but were never unified into a single formal agreement.
4. The Italian Claims (Treaty of London, 1915)
Italy, promised territory for joining the Allies, expected:
Southwestern Anatolia, including Antalya and surrounding regions.
Influence along the Mediterranean coast.
These claims were later partially recognized in the 1917 St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, which overlapped with Sykes–Picot zones and created further contradictions.
5. The Zionist Aspirations for a Jewish Homeland
While not a partition plan in the same sense, the Balfour Declaration (1917)—developed in the same geopolitical moment—proposed:
A Jewish national home in Palestine, which Sykes–Picot had placed under international administration.
This created yet another competing vision for the future of Ottoman Palestine.
6. The Russian Imperial Vision
Russia supported Sykes–Picot but also had its own aims:
Eastern Anatolia as a sphere of influence.
Access to warm-water ports and control of the Straits (as in the Constantinople Agreement).
The Bolshevik Revolution ended these ambitions, but they shaped negotiations up to 1917.
7. The British “India Office” Plan
Within Britain, different departments had conflicting visions:
The India Office favored direct British control over Mesopotamia (Iraq) to secure routes to India.
This clashed with the Foreign Office, which was more willing to compromise with France.
These internal disagreements produced multiple draft maps before Sykes–Picot was finalized.
8. The French “Greater Syria” Vision
France sought:
A large Syrian mandate, including modern Syria, Lebanon, and parts of southeastern Turkey.
This ambition predated Sykes–Picot and shaped the French insistence on a large “blue zone” in the agreement.
I hate to say this but the worst thing the Allies did was destroy the Ottoman Empire’s control of the Middle East.