Mitsotakis Changes Course: No Mirage Jets to Ukraine, No to Israel For Lebanon

ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ

By Nick Stamatakis

In foreign policy, timing often reveals more than rhetoric. And in the span of just a few days, the government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis has offered two decisions that, taken together, expose a deeper tension at the heart of Greece’s current strategic posture.

Only days ago, Helleniscope warned of what it described as a “disastrous policy” – a tendency by Athens to align itself reflexively with the “right side of history” in both Ukraine and the Middle East, rather than pursuing the balanced, multi-vector diplomacy that defined Greek foreign policy in the decades following World War II. (Please follow the link to read our significant article just a few days ago). Now, events seem to be catching up with that critique.

Ukraine: alignment meets limits

France has reportedly pressed Greece to transfer its Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Ukraine—an initiative that would have reinforced Kyiv’s air capabilities—while offering, in return, improved terms for the acquisition of Rafale aircraft.

Athens, however, has refused to proceed.

This is no small detail. Greece has consistently positioned itself within the Western consensus on Ukraine, politically and rhetorically aligning with its NATO and EU partners. Yet when confronted with a decision that would directly affect its own military readiness, the government stepped back.

Prudence? Certainly. But also something else: a recognition—perhaps belated—that strategic assets cannot be sacrificed for symbolic alignment.

The contradiction is difficult to ignore. Greece appears willing to endorse the broader framework of Western policy, but less willing to absorb its tangible costs. The result is a posture that risks appearing neither fully committed nor fully independent. But certainly more balanced and more supportive of Greece’s interests.

Middle East: from solidarity to caution

A similar pattern is emerging in the Middle East.

In recent statements, Mitsotakis described Israeli operations in Lebanon as “completely counterproductive,” warning that they risk fueling further instability and even strengthening Hezbollah. He called for a halt to hostilities and emphasized that Lebanon must be included in any meaningful peace process.

These remarks are notable not for their content alone, but for their timing.

Greece has, in recent years, cultivated a close strategic partnership with Israel—expanding defense cooperation and positioning itself as a key regional partner. That relationship has been a cornerstone of Athens’ Eastern Mediterranean strategy.

And yet, when the consequences of escalation became harder to ignore, the tone shifted. Greece now seeks to reintroduce balance into a policy that had leaned heavily toward alignment.

A pattern of reaction, not strategy

Taken together, recent moves point less to long-term planning than to reactive adjustment: in Ukraine, alignment first and hesitation later; in the Middle East, alignment first and criticism later. The pattern suggests policy shaped more by external pressure than by a consistent doctrine—echoing Helleniscope’s warning that Greece is drifting from the strategic independence it once maintained.

The case for balance

For decades after World War II, Greek foreign policy, although never doubting the country’s position in the West, emphasized balance: keeping channels open, avoiding overcommitment, and preserving room to maneuver. Recent mistakes, esp. invoking the “right side of history,” risked replacing strategy with signaling, limiting flexibility, exposing Greece to risk without clear gain, and weakening its role as a regional intermediary.

Conclusion

The Mirage decision and the criticism of Israeli operations may appear corrective, but they raise a deeper question: is Greece acting strategically—or adjusting only after costs emerge? The answer is unclear now. What is clear is that in a volatile environment, balance is no longer optional—it is essential.