The Hidden Story Behind the US – Iran Memorandum of Understanding

ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ

According to experienced diplomat Alastair Crooke, the agreement is not a peace treaty but a temporary de-escalation mechanism designed to halt an immediate regional war while postponing the most contentious issues—nuclear enrichment, sanctions, Lebanon, and the Strait of Hormuz—to future negotiations.

By Helleniscope’s Editorial Team

There is much hype about a recently reached Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran. According to former British diplomat and intelligence officer, Alastair Crooke, talking with Judge Andrew Napolitano, however, this agreement does not constitute any form of a peace deal or full settlement of all the disputes that brought Washington and Tehran close to a new Middle Eastern War.

Instead, the Memorandum is a ceasefire deal – it gives a sixty-day pause to stop a local regional explosion from happening and leaves all other issues on hold for later discussion.

Specifically, according to Crooke, “everything substantive has been kicked down the road”. The question of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the existing sanctions, the regional security arrangements, and relations between Iran and the United States of America are all left to be discussed at a later time. In other words, the current situation is only a temporary ceasefire mechanism.

Intriguingly, this ceasefire deal came very close to never happening due to a third party.

When the negotiations were approaching their final stage, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, ordered an assassination in Beirut’s southern suburb of Dahiyeh. This assassination took the life of an official of Hezbollah, Ali Dakdouk.

Dakdouk had long been a priority target both for Israeli forces and the US, as he was blamed for orchestrating attacks resulting in the deaths of US citizens in Iraq.

Israeli leaders probably believed that this move would be met with approval from Washington. On the contrary, Crooke reports, it was the opposite case.

President Trump became extremely angry and considered Netanyahu’s decision a blow to his personal diplomatic achievement. As a result, the assassination became the catalyst for further negotiations, rather than a hindrance.

Confronted with the threat of retaliation from Iran, the White House became intent upon saving the agreement.

It resulted in the following key concessions:

Firstly, the US agreed to lift the naval blockade of the region, which had prevented Iranian shipping from passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Secondly, some wording was inserted regarding the future arrangement of the management of maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz. Namely, during the first sixty days, Iran would guarantee free access to the region, leaving aside the payments. Then the country would be entitled to charge navigation, environmental protection, maritime security, and insurance fees from the ships passing through the Strait.

Thirdly, sanctions relief would precede any possible solution to the nuclear dispute. Specifically, as Crooke explains, tens of billions of dollars of Iranian assets, previously frozen in various banks across the world, would be made available to the Iranians. Moreover, most of those funds would appear at Iran’s disposal well before the end of the sixty days.

Perhaps the most important concession by Washington was allowing Iranian oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, after years of embargo, Iranian energy could return to global markets.

These conditions should be interpreted in light of the following context.

According to Crooke, after the assassination in Beirut, Washington tried to convince Tehran to abstain from revenge in exchange for releasing billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets. In response, Tehran reiterated its refusal. Not only did the country consider this money to belong to it, but Tehran was more concerned with maintaining Lebanon and helping Hezbollah than anything else.

After this point, the United States began to concede on issues such as Hormuz, sanctions relief, and control over shipping in the Strait.

As a result, an interesting irony was born.

Netanyahu’s efforts to sabotage negotiations, ironically, only strengthened Iran’s position and accelerated the process of reaching a ceasefire agreement.

Here is the excellent account of Alastair Crook in an interview this morning by Judge Napolitano:

However, the main problem with this ceasefire deal lies ahead.

Specifically, Crooke states that the agreement contains some wording suggesting that Israel would withdraw from Lebanon and observe a ceasefire there. Nevertheless, top Israeli officials have already made public statements that they consider themselves exempt from the ceasefire.

For Crooke, this is the fundamental vulnerability of the entire framework.

According to Crooke, achieving the ceasefire agreement is the easier part of negotiations. Maintaining it is the hard one. Indeed, in recent years Israel developed a post-October 7 policy doctrine, accepting no constraints on its military actions in the Middle East, regardless of the political leadership.

Therefore, as Crooke explains, Iran signs this deal with the knowledge that the actions of Israel in Lebanon can easily break it.

To Crooke, Iranian leadership knew that this deal would never turn into a definitive peace settlement. The main thing they were trying to prove was that they possess diplomatic flexibility, economic benefits, open shipping lines, and that Iran is ready to make deals that Washington is unable to break.

Thus, the memorandum’s implications might go beyond mere diplomacy.

For a few decades now, US foreign policy towards Iran has been based on sanctions, isolation, and economic pressure. The Memorandum of Understanding implies that this approach proved to be unsuccessful.

Iranian leadership remains firmly in power.

Iranian nuclear infrastructure still exists.

The country retains its stockpile of enriched uranium.

Its regional alliances remain in place.

Moreover, after years of sanctions and pressure, Iran maintains its status as one of the dominant powers in the Middle East.

To Crooke, this agreement implies that Washington is beginning to admit to a harsh reality. Neither military pressure nor economic warfare could change anything essential about Iran’s strategic position.

However, the sustainability of this framework remains to be seen.

The same flashpoints remain intact. Lebanon is still volatile. The Strait of Hormuz is still a contested area. Sanctions can always resume. Retaliation may happen anytime.

For now, the Memorandum of Understanding can be seen as an opportunity for both parties to take a breath, relax, and think more about the next steps.

Jun 15, 2026, n.stamatakis@aol.com   www.helleniscope.com

DISCLAIMER: The views and statements expressed in this article constitute constitutionally protected opinions of this author.

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