ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ
Cyprus does not become stronger by arguing that every invasion is historically equivalent. It becomes stronger when its own history, treaties and international legal record are allowed to speak for themselves.…
By Nick Stamatakis
The comparison between Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is superficially attractive to Greek and Cypriot diplomacy. In both cases, a larger neighboring state used military force against an internationally recognized sovereign state and occupied territory.
But the analogy becomes misleading when pushed too far. Cyprus does not need Ukraine in order to establish the illegality of the continuing Turkish occupation. By presenting the two cases as essentially identical, Greece risks obscuring the very historical, legal and geopolitical circumstances that make Cyprus distinctive.
On top of all else, Greek and Cypriot diplomacy are shooting themselves in the foot: While Turkey has been “mediating” incessantly between Russia and Ukraine (as she is selling arms to Ukraine while buying cheap oil and gas from Russia along with maintaining extensive economic ties), Mitsotakis proves himself to be the FIRST Greek Prime Minister since 1945 to “declare war on Russia” – the most important geopolitical adversary Turkey has had in its history. Recent developments make this point even clearer.
The stronger position is simple: one can condemn violations of Ukrainian sovereignty while recognizing that the road to war in Ukraine was fundamentally different from the circumstances that produced the Cyprus problem.
1. Cyprus arose from a different legal and constitutional framework
The events of 1974 cannot be separated from the constitutional order established when Cyprus became independent in 1960. Greece, Turkey and Britain became guarantor powers under the Treaty of Guarantee.
Nor can the Turkish intervention be separated from the coup against President Makarios on 15 July 1974, organized with the involvement of the Greek military dictatorship and aimed at Enosis.
This does not legitimize what followed. Whatever argument Turkey could make concerning its initial intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, the subsequent occupation, territorial division and establishment of a separate entity in northern Cyprus went far beyond restoration of the 1960 constitutional order. The United Nations repeatedly defended Cyprus’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and later declared the attempted secession in the north legally invalid.
Ukraine had no equivalent treaty relationship with Russia. On the contrary, post-Soviet Russia had formally recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and existing borders.
The legal and historical foundations of the two cases are therefore very different.
2. Ukraine cannot be understood outside the post-Cold War security order
The geopolitical background matters even more.
During German reunification negotiations in 1990, Western officials gave Soviet leaders political assurances concerning NATO’s eastward military reach. James Baker’s famous reference to NATO moving “not one inch eastward” formed part of a broader discussion over the European security settlement.
It would be inaccurate to claim that this amounted to a binding treaty permanently prohibiting NATO enlargement. But it is equally misleading to pretend that no assurances were given or that Moscow’s subsequent sense of strategic encirclement appeared from nowhere.
The stronger argument is that Western governments pursued NATO enlargement in a way Russia increasingly saw as contradicting the political understandings surrounding the end of the Cold War.
Ukraine eventually became the central issue. Henry Kissinger argued in 2014 that Ukraine should remain outside NATO and function as a bridge between Russia and Europe rather than an outpost of either side.
Whether one agrees with that prescription or not, it reflected a basic principle of realist geopolitics: great powers are especially sensitive to military alignments directly on their borders.
Recognizing that fact does not justify invasion. It explains why the conflict cannot be understood simply as an unprovoked territorial adventure without a geopolitical prehistory.

3. Crimea was strategically exceptional
Crimea further distinguishes the Ukrainian case.
It was transferred from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1954, when both were parts of the same Soviet state. After the USSR collapsed, Crimea became part of independent Ukraine.
Its strategic importance to Russia nevertheless remained extraordinary because Sevastopol was the historic base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia therefore negotiated agreements with Ukraine permitting continued naval use of Sevastopol.
This does not provide legal justification for annexation. Indeed, Russia’s need to negotiate basing rights confirmed Ukrainian sovereignty.
But from a great-power strategy perspective, Moscow could never have treated Crimea as ordinary territory. Western policymakers who ignored that reality underestimated the intensity of Russian security concerns.
Again, strategic explanation is not the same thing as legal justification.
4. Minsk and the failure of diplomacy matter
The diplomatic history after 2014 also distinguishes Ukraine from Cyprus.
The Minsk agreements were intended to create a ceasefire and political settlement in the Donbas. Their implementation failed amid profound disagreement over security, local autonomy, elections and control of the border.
Angela Merkel later stated that Minsk had given Ukraine time to become stronger. Her comments reinforced Moscow’s belief that Western governments had treated the agreement partly as a way to buy time. French President Francois Hollande offered a similar admission. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Minsk process failed because of the West’s responsibility and that subsequent Western statements deepened Russian suspicions about the sincerity of the diplomatic framework.
The Istanbul negotiations of spring 2022 deserve similar caution.
Russia and Ukraine discussed neutrality, security guarantees and territorial questions in serious negotiations. A peace treaty had already been initially “mongraphed” and was merely awaiting President Zelensky’s signature when Boris Johnson visited Kyiv. Mr. Johnson made sure Zelensky would never sign.
Important questions remained unresolved.
The Istanbul talks demonstrate that diplomatic alternatives existed and that Russian, Ukrainian and Western calculations all influenced their collapse. Reducing the war’s history to a simple confrontation between aggression and resistance leaves out this important dimension.
5. Minority and religious questions should not be ignored
Ukraine’s policies toward Russian speakers and religious institutions have also generated legitimate criticism.
International bodies have raised concerns regarding aspects of Ukrainian language legislation and the treatment of minority-language rights. More recent disputes involving the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have likewise produced human-rights concerns.
These issues may not justify invasion, but is there anyone who – knowing the heavy and unjustified human rights violations by the Ukro-nazi Zelensky regime – who would not see, at least minimally, Russia’s attempt to protect its own nationals through a positive lens? After all, if Zelensky himself, whose own native tongue is Russian, comes to ban the use of the Russian language not only in the public sector and in education but also in grocery stores (!) one has to wonder what kind of interests hide behind him…
In this framework, should I remind everyone that the key actor in the Ukraine 2014 coup was led by Victoria Nuland, whose family roots trace back to a Ukrainian Jewish family, while her arch-neocon husband, Robert Kagan, is also from a Lithuanian Jewish family? (Note: this arch-neocon, Kagan, has recently admitted Ukraine’s defeat..)
6. Why the analogy may harm Greek interests
For Greece and Cyprus, equating the two conflicts is a substantial strategic problem.
First, Cyprus already possesses an exceptionally strong case under international law. It rests on UN resolutions, the internationally recognised sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, non-recognition of the northern entity and decades of European jurisprudence. Cyprus does not need the Ukrainian analogy.
Second, Greece should distinguish support for Ukrainian sovereignty from permanent geopolitical hostility toward Russia.
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated “We are waging war against Russia” (frequently paraphrased as “We are at war with Russia”) during an interview with Bloomberg on September 22, 2022. The Mitsotakis government did not literally “declare war” on Russia, but it aligned Greece very closely with the Western response to the invasion, including sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine – which, by the way, softened the defense of the Greek Islands.
Turkey followed a different approach. Ankara condemned Russia’s invasion and supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but maintained relations with Moscow, avoided full participation in Western sanctions, hosted negotiations and played a mediating role. All this while Turkey bought cheap Russian oil and gas and maintained extensive economic relations with Russia in every sector.
Whatever one thinks of Turkish policy, it demonstrated strategic flexibility.
Greece should draw the appropriate lesson: a middle-sized state in a difficult geopolitical environment benefits from preserving diplomatic options.
Nor is it necessary to describe Russia as Greece’s “eternal friend” or Turkey as Russia’s “eternal enemy.” States do not have eternal friendships; they have enduring interests. Russia and Turkey have fought repeatedly throughout history, but they also cooperate whenever their interests overlap.
That is precisely why Greece should avoid unnecessarily narrowing its own strategic room for maneuver. We should not, however, downplay the friendship between the two countries. Nor should we ignore the excellent cooperation of Greek shipowners with Russia over the last 4-5 years. The shipowners are not puppets of any “puppetmaster” in London and DC – they historically express the genuine interests of Hellenism. They should be given a permanent advisory board within the Greek Foreign Ministry…
Conclusion
The strongest Greek position is not that Russia was justified in invading Ukraine.
It is that Cyprus and Ukraine emerged from fundamentally different legal, historical and geopolitical circumstances and should not be mechanically equated.
Cyprus arose from the collapse of a specific constitutional system, a Greek-backed coup, a treaty framework involving three guarantor powers and a Turkish intervention that developed into permanent occupation and partition.
Ukraine arose from the unresolved post-Cold War European security order, NATO enlargement, Ukraine’s strategic position between Russia and the West, the exceptional importance of Crimea and Sevastopol, the breakdown of Minsk, and the broader failure of diplomacy.
None of these factors eliminates Ukrainian sovereignty. But international politics cannot be understood solely through legal categories while ignoring great-power security interests.
For Greece and Cyprus, the wiser strategy is therefore to defend the Cyprus case on its own exceptionally strong legal foundations while avoiding analogies that unnecessarily tie Hellenic interests to one interpretation of a very different war.
Cyprus does not become stronger by arguing that every invasion is historically equivalent. It becomes stronger when its own history, treaties and international legal record are allowed to speak for themselves.
August 15, 2026, www.helleniscope.com n.stamatakis@aol.com
DISCLAIMER: The views and statements expressed in this article constitute constitutionally protected opinions of this author.




Helleniscope ,thank you for the analysis and the history lesson on the topic of divergence on Cyprus vs Ukraine Analogy.
What is missing is the discrepancy ,the hypocrisy, that has upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean Sea by the Invasion of Turkey on July 20th 1974 on a defenseless non- aligned of 1/2 a million-people- 81% Greek Orthodox Christians who represent a branch of the Hellenic Civilization.
Review the facts of the case: It was critical time , the Vietnam War was ending to formulate peace in Paris . Kissinger the Nobel Prize Winner was the US Envoy. Hypocritically , making accolades, while turning his back on the Cypriot Invasion along as you state. Offsetting and obscuring his duties / FM -Callahan for Great Britain, a nation with British Bases in Cyprus who failed to Guarantee The
provisions of The 1960 Treaty of Cypriot Independence? I had just taken a long day US Foreign
Service Test at the University of Washington at the time . A turbulent time for the USA as Pres.
Nixon was against the ropes from the Watergate Scandal. He resigned within few weeks in early August of 1974 and the Greek Government was is transition from the 7 year- episode due to the regime of
the Papadopoulos Dictatorship. The set up was to take out-(Archbishop Makarios )as Kissinger declared
“that he was a threat to American Democracy”-that he “was the Castro of the Mediterranean World”?? Bunch of BS!
Now please keep in mind, as to what happened -next-so the people reading my comments may respond if need be? The point is that USA/NATO is a primarily and almost 90% a by- product of Christian
and Western Civilization. Meaning , that on Oct 28th and on March 25th-at the White House in DC admires and everyone honors Hellenic Institutions -not only of the role of 1st DEFENSE in WWII against Mussolini that my father fought, but at least W Churchill proclaimed it as a Hellenic/Heroic Accomplishment -So What? Does it matter today? Question ?? GB’S Foreign Minister Callahan – he forgot the sacrifice by the Hellenes, who fought during WWII- for European Freedom ! Where was Turkey?? who now threatens the 12-mile UNCLOS?? Clueless, Kissinger who worked in our nation’s
Hellenic Inspired Columned Federal Buildings without noticing what the USA Founding Fathers Indoctrination of “The Hellenization of America” from Athens Georgia to Olympia WA my state of Washington.
My point is that Europe/NATO USA is immersed and baptized from Hellenic Institutions not from
Ukrainian nor Turkish implementation – Ukraine and Turkey ARE NOT ON THE RADAR IN AMERICA’S HISTORY!!
As Loyal Hellenes, we are all offended by NATO/USA who are a by- product of the Hellenic Civilization . It is anathema and blasphemous to
violate and distort historical facts that jeopardizes Hellenic Sovereignty ?? Why support Ukraine and Turkey and turn a blind eye to
Greek 12 Mile Limit in the Aegean Sea?? Why invade Cyprus with US Arms and bomb the Christian Orthodox Serbs under the Clinton Administration under Sec Albright! The Picture is obscene for the Hellenic People. This Picture stinks to the core -to Attack Christian Orthodoxy -by Islamist Turks- by USA Arms- to violate the Hellenic World on all levels? Greece- Cyprus- Serbs- Russia, they are all Orthodox Christians who are pivotal-crucial to Western Civilization to Europe and to America!
No one in the US State Dept. recognizes nor cares? that in Kolonaki, Athens the American School of Classical Studies is funded by 200 US Universities and Colleges form the USA as the worlds finest Academic Institution- to advance Western Civilization from our- the Hellenic “TOPOS” since 1881? Kissinger’s
debacle in 1974- pissed off all the American Phil-Hellenic -US Professors- in Athens and Corinth! Now I will close – Question? Will Zelenesky or Erdogan carry the Olympic Flame from Olympia Peloponnese Greece as tribute to honor 10,000 athletes form 200 nations, to contribute their talents in the name of the Olympic Truce on the International Stage in Los Angeles CA in 2028! ??