ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ
Kasidiaris’s release has revived questions about his political influence – and whether he can translate deep anti-establishment resentment into electoral power. Even if the courts keep him off the ballot, the 2023 Spartans precedent suggests he could still redirect votes and remain a consequential factor in Greece’s next election.
By Nick Stamatakis
Ilias Kasidiaris’s release from prison has reopened a question Greece’s political establishment may have hoped was settled: how much influence can the former Golden Dawn figure still exercise over the electorate?
Kasidiaris immediately announced plans to return to politics through a new “national party.” Yet, as Naftemporiki reports, creating a party is one thing; being allowed to contest an election is another. Greece’s Supreme Court can examine not only a party’s nominal leadership but who actually directs and controls it. That creates a serious legal obstacle to any attempt by Kasidiaris to return through a proxy leadership structure.
But his political influence may not depend on appearing personally on the ballot.
The precedent is the June 2023 election. Although Kasidiaris and his own political formation had been excluded, he endorsed the little-known Spartans party from prison. The Spartans then won 4.68 percent of the vote and entered Parliament with 12 MPs. Whatever one thinks of Kasidiaris, that result showed he could still influence a meaningful bloc of voters even while imprisoned and formally excluded from electoral politics.
That may be his real “secret card.”
Kasidiaris is routinely described as extreme right or far right, and his conviction in the Golden Dawn criminal-organization case is an essential part of his record. But those labels alone do not explain why some voters remain attracted to him.
His appeal must also be understood against a deeper crisis of confidence in Greece’s post-1974 political system, particularly after the debt crisis, the memoranda, austerity, unemployment and the widespread perception that successive governments surrendered too much economic sovereignty to Greece’s creditors.
That resentment has not disappeared with economic recovery. OECD data continue to show very low trust in Greece’s national government, while recent surveys indicate broad dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions.
This does not mean Greeks as a whole reject democracy. In fact, large majorities continue to support democratic government. But a smaller, growing minority expresses sympathy for a “strong leader” unconstrained by Parliament or elections, while some even say military government could be acceptable.
PHOTO: Ilias Kasidiaris after his release from jail today.
That distinction matters.
In my own conversations in Greece, I have repeatedly heard taxi drivers, acquaintances, and even some people whose political roots were on the Left in the 1970s express deep hostility toward the established political class. Some speak nostalgically of military-style leadership; others say they would consider voting for Kasidiaris. These conversations are anecdotes, not opinion polls, but they illustrate a broader frustration documented in national surveys. Who trusts opinion polls, anyway? Would the likely Kasidiaris voters ever declare their intentions to any pollster? Absolutely not. This is why I am using the term “secret card”. His appeal is quite widespread and not easily visible. But a simple look at the far-and-wide reports of his release from prison today is evidence of what may be coming.
The important political divide may therefore no longer be simply Left versus Right. Among some voters, it is increasingly system versus anti-system.
That does not mean Kasidiaris commands such voters as a unified bloc. Nor does it mean he will be legally permitted to stand in the next election. But the 2023 experience shows that excluding him personally does not necessarily eliminate his political influence.
The crucial question, then, is not only whether Kasidiaris will appear on the ballot.
It is what happens to his voters if he does not.
Will he create a formation capable of surviving judicial scrutiny? Will he endorse another party? Will his supporters disperse among nationalist and protest parties, or abstain? And will his return force established parties to change their rhetoric to contain anti-system anger?
Kasidiaris may not hold the decisive card in Greece’s next election. But he clearly holds a card that the political establishment cannot ignore.
His importance lies less in the label attached to him than in the resentment he is attempting to mobilize: distrust of political elites, anger over the memorandum years and the belief among a significant minority that the post-1974 political order has failed them.
Whether the courts allow him onto the ballot is a legal question.
Whether those grievances remain politically powerful is another matter entirely.
Sources
- Naftemporiki, Sept. 15, 2026 — Kasidiaris’s release, proposed new party, and the legal barriers to electoral participation. Read article
- Naftemporiki, Sept. 15, 2026 — His announcement of a new “national party” following his release. Read article
- Kathimerini — The 2023 Spartans precedent: the party received 4.68% and elected 12 MPs after Kasidiaris’s endorsement. Read article
- OECD, 2026 — Trust in Greece’s national government fell from 32% in 2023 to 24% in 2025. OECD Survey on Greece
- diaNEOsis / World Values Survey 2025 — 17.7% viewed rule by a strong leader outside parliamentary/electoral controls positively, while 14.5% viewed military government positively. Read the survey
- European Stability Mechanism — Official Greek bailout-loan repayment schedules extend to 2060 for ESM loans and 2070 for EFSF loans. ESM repayment overview
September 15, 2026, www.helleniscope.com, n.stamatakis@aol.com
DISCLAIMER: The views and statements expressed in this article constitute constitutionally protected opinions of this author.
