By Nick Stamatakis
Since 1945, Greece has consistently aligned itself with the West. Following the Yalta Agreements between Stalin, FDR, and Churchill, the country has consistently maintained a one-sided foreign policy, aligning itself with the West (although it has kept a “small” open door to Russia and recently made deals with other countries, primarily China). This 80-year-old policy was followed by all Greek governments without exception, even by the military dictatorship of 1967-74. But even this rather “small” open door to the East was abandoned by Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who openly declared “war on Russia”. To show how “abnormal” this statement is, suffice it to say that Turkey and Israel, despite very deep ties with the West, avoided such foolish statements.
This monolithic policy brings to mind the most erudite Hellene of modern times and the number one authority in International Law globally, Sir Basil Markesinis (1944-2023 – biography here). He is undoubtedly missed… Sir Basil Markesinis had long championed a departure from Greece’s traditionally narrow diplomatic orientation. His proposal? A deliberately metaphorical yet piercingly realist concept: a “polyamorous” foreign policy.
Let’s unpack what he means.
Sir Basil doesn’t use the term “polyamorous” in the moral or personal sense. He fully acknowledges that the term is provocative, chosen precisely for that reason. It underscores the unromantic, often transactional, and frequently ruthless nature of international politics. As he puts it, foreign policy is inherently “immoral,” not in a pejorative sense, but in the realist tradition: states act not out of loyalty or ethics, but based on national interest and survival.
In this light, “polygamy” becomes a vivid metaphor for a multi-partnered, flexible, and non-exclusive approach to diplomacy. It suggests that a country like Greece, rather than being locked into a single strategic orientation (for example, Atlanticism via NATO and the EU), should actively cultivate multiple relationships across diverse geopolitical centers. This approach, he argues, is not only rational but increasingly necessary in a world where global power is no longer unipolar.
Why Does Greece Need a “Polyamorous” Strategy?
Greece, historically and geographically, is situated at a crossroads between East and West, North and South, Christianity and Islam, Europe and the Middle East. It lies on the edge of the European continent, but its cultural and historical experiences also tie it deeply to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.
Yet, for decades, Greek foreign policy has leaned heavily toward Western-centric alliances—NATO, the European Union, and bilateral ties with the United States forming the pillars of its strategic orientation. While these relationships remain vital, Sir Basil warns that placing all eggs in one basket limits Greece’s maneuverability and leaves it vulnerable when Western partners pursue interests that conflict with Greek concerns (such as in the case of Turkey).
Instead, he proposes a multi-dimensional (or “multi-aligned”) diplomacy that treats global powers not as ideological choices but as potential partners—based on mutual interest.
In His Own Words
In a now-famous televised interview from 2011, Markesinis declared:
“Because international relations are inherently immoral, a certain ‘polygamy’ becomes necessary. One must retain the freedom to speak and deal with many powers—without shame and without ideological rigidity.”
He stresses that this is not about betraying alliances or abandoning shared values, but about strategic adaptability. In his vision, Greece should maintain strong ties with traditional allies (US, EU), but also cultivate deeper engagement with Russia, China, India, and the Arab world. Each relationship offers unique advantages—energy security, trade, regional influence, defense diplomacy—and none should be treated as mutually exclusive.
You can listen to Sir Basil Markesinis himself explaining his views here:
From Theory to Practice
Markesinis’ writings, especially his 2010 book “A New Foreign Policy for Greece”, offer detailed proposals on implementing this strategy. He outlines a recalibration of foreign relations centered on:
Energy diplomacy – leveraging Greece’s geographical position and EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) potential in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
Geopolitical hedging – reducing overdependence on any single power bloc.
Cultural and economic outreach – expanding soft power and trade with emerging markets.
Strategic patience with Turkey – combining deterrence with diversified international backing.
He further emphasizes that Russia, despite Western skepticism, remains a critical player in the region. Greece could (and should) engage Moscow on energy, religion (Orthodox ties), and shared interests in Eastern Mediterranean stability.
Likewise, he underscores the economic and strategic significance of China, not only through trade and investment (such as the port of Piraeus), but also through diplomatic balancing. Greece, he suggests, can become a bridge between Europe and Asia, rather than a passive frontier.
The Turkish Question and Strategic Autonomy
One of the central pillars of Markesinis’ argument is that Greece needs strategic leverage against the unpredictable nature of Turkish foreign policy. Relying solely on Western assurances, he warns, has repeatedly proven insufficient in defending Greece’s sovereign interests—whether in the Aegean, Cyprus, or the delimitation of maritime zones, which we now face. Let’s not forget that for decades, the standard policy emanating from the State Department regarding the EEZ dispute with Turkey has been calling for an “equitable distribution.” However, the U.S. never applied this perverted principle in its delineation with Cuba and the Bahamas. And when it comes to the South China Sea, the State Department always rejects the expansionist China policies against “island” or “archipelagic” countries such as Taiwan or the Philippines. But when it comes to Turkish expansionism and violation of international laws the State Department starts the “equitable” theory. What if some countries supported “equitable” EEZ for China? Why the double standards?
A more diversified foreign policy would provide Greece with alternative sources of support and deterrence, thereby discouraging Turkish adventurism and bolstering Athens’ international posture.
Risks and Criticisms
Of course, Markesinis’ approach is not without controversy. Critics argue that engaging rival powers such as Russia or China might raise concerns among Greece’s Western allies. It could blur diplomatic priorities and provoke accusations of inconsistency or “fence-sitting.”
But for Markesinis, such risks are manageable—and preferable—when compared to the dangers of strategic inflexibility. In his view, alliances should never become prisons. They should serve national interests, not constrain them.
Strategic Realism in a Multipolar World
At its core, Sir Basil’s proposal reflects a deep understanding of the shifting global order. A single superpower no longer dominates the 21st century. Multipolarity, fluid alignments, and strategic pragmatism define it.
Small and medium-sized states, such as Greece, must navigate the world with sophistication. “Polygamy,” as he envisions it, is not moral relativism but diplomatic realism. It is about resisting ideological dogma and reclaiming strategic agency.
Conclusion: A Call to Strategic Maturity
Ultimately, Sir Basil Markesinis’ “polyamorous foreign policy” is a call for strategic maturity. It asks Greek leaders and diplomats to think beyond old loyalties and rigid paradigms. To look at the world not as a battleground of black-and-white alliances, but as a chessboard full of opportunities—and threats. In one sentence, to follow the paradigm of the strongest foundation of Modern Greece, the maritime industry, which has its doors open to the whole world, and has proved it even stronger in the last 5-10 years.
Whether Greece will heed this advice remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: in an increasingly volatile world, flexibility, autonomy, and realism may prove far more valuable than predictability alone.




Well, he is on point. The Empire still stands but its lights are out. Sovereign nations are moving away from the unipolar to the multipolar Global South.
The article makes good points. His main recommendation is that “Greece should maintain strong ties with traditional allies (US, EU), but also cultivate deeper engagement with Russia, China, India, and the Arab world.”
Fine, but, specifically, what about NATO? Is he for staying in it (my preference) or leaving it?
If Markesinis was aware of the most recent developments he would likely say that NATO has lost its purpose of existence and it has to be dismantled or dissolved. He and many others in the West were against NATO expansion after the fall of communism in 1990.
Sure, NATO might choose to dissolve at some point in the future, but as long as it is in existence, Greece should remain a member. Right, folks?
Markesinis, along with the overwhelming majority of western geopolitical thinkers (not to be confused with those “bought” be the neocon think-tanks) -and the name list is long and impressive – suggested consistently that the West through all its organization should engage Russia and not oppose it. Unfortunately the puppets leading the West in the last 20 years did the exact opposite. THEY LOST THE GAME. And now, in order not to lose their sinecures, they are pushing things to the extreme, not caring if their foolish acts will lead to a WWW III.
I do not want those various “puppets” to be “pushing things to the extreme” any more than you do. But I note that you stopped short of saying that Greece should leave NATO.
Stay in NATO Greece, stay.
Greece has no interest to take this initiative against NATO. Last time it did – in 1975 – it did not end well.
Greece should leave NATO and regain independence. What has NATO done for Greece?
In 1955, after the anti Greek pogroms on Constantinople NATO refused to condemn Turkey or support Greece.
NATO subsidizes the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, and has refused to condemn Turkish threats to invade Greece.
NATO is an offensive alliance existing to start wars as it did against Serbia and more recently against Russia.
Greek independence in foreign policy does not even exist under NATO. I will grant withdrawal might have uncertain consequences but NATO membership does not benefit Greece.
Agreed – all points well taken. But Turkey is part of NATO and is quite independent. What is the difference? Mainly leadership among other reasons. In essence Turkey is practicing the “polyamorous” foreign policy suggested by Markesinis.