ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ
OUR MAIN PHOTO: An artistic rendition of the proposed meeting
Constantinople summons Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem as the Orthodox world searches for unity amid the widening rupture with Moscow.
By Nick Stamatakis
The initiative announced by Pat. Bartholomew is more significant than the reports’ restrained wording suggests. On September 4 in Budapest, Bartholomew disclosed that he had invited the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem to Constantinople for a “brotherly Synaxis” on November 30, 2026, the feast of St Andrew and the throne feast of Constantinople. His language was deliberately historical: the four are the surviving ancient Eastern Apostolic Thrones which, together with Rome, formed the old Pentarchy, and he argued that they now carry a special responsibility to address the “great and pressing challenges” confronting Christianity. This framing matters because it makes the meeting less a pan-Orthodox council and more politically consequential (definitely acting as an agency of the declining Western powers): Moscow sits conspicuously outside this ancient-patriarchal framework.
Ukraine inevitably hangs over the gathering. Alexandria recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019 and subsequently became embroiled in a bitter jurisdictional confrontation with Moscow in Africa. Antioch, by contrast, explicitly opposed Constantinople’s unilateral handling of Ukrainian autocephaly, insisting in 2018 that the question required pan-Orthodox consensus. Jerusalem likewise has never recognized the OCU, and Theophilos has maintained unusually close relations with Moscow. There is, however, an important nuance: before the Tomos, in 2018, Theophilos publicly endorsed the general principle that an Orthodox nation could possess an independent Church. His subsequent position has therefore been less a rejection of Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence in principle than opposition to the way Constantinople created and recognized the new structure.
The geopolitical environment has certainly changed. Post-Assad Syria is now much more dependent upon accommodation with Washington: the United States removed Syria from its terrorism-sponsor list on August 24, while Damascus has even signaled willingness to reduce Russian oil imports as its relations with Washington deepen. This gives Antioch powerful incentives not to appear tied exclusively to Moscow. Jerusalem is under an even more complicated set of pressures. Theophilos met President Trump in June, has sought American support concerning Christians, Gaza and Church properties, and now speaks of meeting both Putin and Zelensky with Trump’s endorsement. Yet this mediation should not be interpreted simply as an American-induced turn: Jerusalem formally offered mediation between Russia and Ukraine already in 2023.
For that reason, Bartholomew’s initiative seems primarily a reconciliation effort combined with institutional repositioning, rather than a straightforward American campaign to line up the patriarchs against Moscow. Theophilos himself convened the 2020 Amman meeting—attended by Moscow and intended to heal the Ukrainian rupture—while Constantinople stayed away. Bringing Theophilos and John X now to the Phanar would reverse that dynamic: instead of Moscow gathering the dissatisfied Churches around Jerusalem, Constantinople would bring the ancient Patriarchates back into a common conversation. External pressure may facilitate this, but the likely objective is subtler: rebuild Orthodox communication, reaffirm Constantinople’s coordinating role, and gradually deprive Moscow of the argument that Antioch and Jerusalem constitute a permanent counter-bloc. Whether this becomes anti-Moscow alignment or genuine reconciliation will depend on what, if anything, the November Synaxis says about Ukraine.
A further dimension is Bartholomew’s increasingly explicit commitment to rapprochement with Rome. In November 2025, he and Pope Leo XIV jointly reaffirmed their determination to work toward the eventual restoration of full communion between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, presenting the anniversary of Nicaea as a platform for new steps toward Christian unity. This could make the November Synaxis especially delicate. It would, however, be too strong to say that Antioch and Jerusalem are certain to reject Catholic–Orthodox reconciliation itself: Antioch has officially spoken of overcoming Christian division and continuing dialogue with both Eastern and Western Churches, while Jerusalem has hosted the international Catholic–Orthodox theological dialogue. Their likely resistance would concern the terms of unity, papal primacy, and any attempt by Constantinople to advance far-reaching ecclesiological changes without pan-Orthodox consensus—precisely the procedural objection Antioch raised over Ukraine. Bartholomew may nevertheless calculate that today’s geopolitical environment gives him greater leverage: strong Western diplomatic backing for Constantinople, close relations with the Vatican, and the growing dependence of Middle Eastern Christian institutions on Western political protection could make Antioch and Jerusalem more willing to remain inside a Constantinople-led process. Western political and globalist support is the main tool used in the background to support Bartholomew’s heretical efforts.
September 6, 2026, www.helleniscope.com, n.stamatakis@aol.com
DISCLAIMER: The views and statements expressed in this article constitute constitutionally protected opinions of this author.
