By Giorgos Harvalias (link here to dimokratia.gr for the original Greek article)
Much has been said in recent days about the “Shield of Achilles” and the benefits it is expected to bring to Greece’s military deterrence. I am not in a position to assess the project from an economic or technical standpoint, and I would have preferred it to have been approved by an independent, cross-party committee of experts—for example, former Chiefs of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff—because the sums involved are large and the temptations… considerable.
It is true that over the past 15 years Greek diplomacy’s attitude toward Israel has shifted in a corrective way, imposed by circumstances. All recent Greek governments, to varying degrees, have sought to strengthen bilateral relations, particularly in the defense sector, as a “window of opportunity” appeared to create a deterrent bloc against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s revisionist Turkey.
Both sides took steps gradually and pursued ambitious energy-cooperation projects that, however, largely remained plans on paper.
The violent upheaval of the regional balance of power – with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and Israel’s overwhelming response to the terrorist attacks of October 7, which led to prolonged military involvement in the Palestinian territories and later in Lebanon—has, in truth, put Israel on a course toward open confrontation with Turkey. It is a confrontation continually fueled by inflammatory statements from both sides.
Suddenly Cyprus, too, entered the picture, with repeated references by Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to its illegal occupation, while at the same time there are growing calls from journalists, military analysts and political figures in Jerusalem enthusiastically supporting a tangible “Greece–Cyprus–Israel alliance,” regardless – and this is the striking part—of whether it has the “blessing” of the American factor.
At first glance, at least, the situation appears particularly attractive to any serious political leadership in Greece—except the current one, which displays an obvious timidity toward Turkey and constantly defines itself in relation to others, with the mentality of a subservient employee of foreign powers.
The Mitsotakis government opened up to Israel only to the extent that the American side gave the “clear” green light. Otherwise, it hit the brakes. Critical energy projects such as the EastMed pipeline, of indisputable strategic value to Greece, were allowed to collapse because that was what the Democratic Party’s American “deep state” and the economic interests represented by Ambassador Pyatt wanted. At the same time, Athens also made strange overtures toward wealthy Arab states, even lending valuable weapons systems under criteria that seem to have had more to do with Mr. Mitsotakis’s personal public relations and certain ministers than with serving our country’s geostrategic interests.
The deployment of Patriot systems to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reflected precisely this mentality. It secured no practical economic benefit for our country. And as for any kind of political alliance, there was none to speak of. The country’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is an erratic figure with zero reliability, going to sleep one way one night and waking up entirely differently the next morning. During the Iranian crisis, the Greek Patriot batteries provided valuable assistance to Riyadh, but instead of receiving thanks, the Saudis rewarded the Mitsotakis government with two diplomatic démarches concerning the EMC undersea data cable that is intended to connect the two countries, demanding that it not pass through Israel—as had been explicitly provided for in the original plan.
So, all of a sudden, Saudi Arabia—on which the… enlightened “Mitsotakis diplomacy” had recklessly placed its bets, going so far as to establish a Supreme Council for Strategic Cooperation between the two countries—changed course. It distanced itself from the IMEC corridor, the trade route intended to connect India with the Middle East and Europe, and even announced a mutual military assistance pact with Turkey and Pakistan!
Mr. Mitsotakis’s special relationship with Qatar—also a very close ally of Turkey—likewise makes absolutely no sense beyond serving certain economic interests of domestic oligarchs. It is well known that this country has been a sponsor of Islamist fundamentalism and, by extension, terrorist networks.
In light of all this, a crucial question arises: Has an alliance with Israel now become the only viable path for a Greek leadership seeking to serve the national interest? At this point, another factor emerges. Israeli economic interests already penetrate Cyprus and Greece, making the broader Greek geographical space valuable in Israeli geostrategic calculations. It would be difficult, for example, for Israel to allow Cyprus – where substantial Israeli capital has been invested – to be destroyed, although the question naturally arises as to whether Israel has sufficient resources to defend it, given the other active fronts in which it is involved.
Another factor supporting the prospect of an alliance is the good relationship between the two peoples. Israelis love modern Greece: they visit it, celebrate to Greek songs, adore Greek food, and enjoy themselves like Greeks. Is that enough? Of course not, but it is another significant factor in the multi-variable equation we are examining.
Yet the crucial question in building a strategic relationship that will ultimately… “marry” us to Israel concerns not how we view our relations with the Jewish nation, but how we view our relations with Turkey. And ultimately, what exactly the Greek people think about that issue. Do we regard a conflict – or at least a confrontation of power – as inevitable in the foreseeable future in order to defend what we have already secured? Are we determined to protect “our fields” in the face of the neighbor’s continual challenges and concrete aggression? Or do we believe we can keep buying time forever, gradually surrendering maritime sovereignty and later territorial sovereignty? Just as the Mitsotakis government is doing today?
That, then, is the first issue: whether we are ready for conflict. If we are, alliances are certainly valuable. Not, of course, theoretical solidarity of the kind offered by the EU and the United States. We have no need for dirty forms of arbitration like those seen in Cyprus and Imia. What we need is military support on the ground.
Can Israel provide it? It is certainly more combat-ready than Macron’s France, which has not heard a “bang” since the Algerian War and is afraid of getting its feet wet.
Israel is certainly militarily capable. But is it reliable? Might it leave us high and dry, or, even worse, use the convergence of interests as an opportunity to instrumentalize Greek-Turkish disputes for its own benefit, creating flashpoints for war in the Aegean and Cyprus?
Do not expect Israel to answer these questions. We should already have it from our own politicians. Are they capable of creating an alliance against Turkey that is completely equal, with tangible reciprocal benefits and binding clauses that will not drag us into Israel’s other conflicts? Can they guarantee that such an alliance would primarily serve deterrence rather than entanglement? These are difficult questions, of course, for a government that enters the international arena in the role of the poor relation and gets slapped around from every direction.
The prospect, therefore, of closer cooperation with Israel is interesting, provided it is assessed according to national cost-benefit criteria rather than according to the interests of obscure financial interests, and provided this is done by a Greek leadership that respects itself and is capable of setting clear boundaries in its relations with both allies and enemies.
Such a leadership does not exist in Greece today.
Let us hope that one emerges after the next elections…
