ΕΑΝ ΠΡΟΤΙΜΑΤΕ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΑΤΗΣΤΕ ΤΗ ΣΗΜΑΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΟΝΗΣ
Experienced retired Army Colonel and State Dept. diplomat Lawrence Wilkerson says Turkey isn’t really “outside” the war dynamics, and he links that to an alleged Netanyahu–Erdogan meeting/interaction in which Netanyahu tried to pitch Erdogan on strategic alignment with Israel!!
By Nick Stamatakis
By now, we have seen plenty of evidence of the desperation in the U.S.-Israeli camp after the failure of their attacks to achieve any of the set goals against Iran, namely, regime change. For example:
- The complete destruction (including their billion-dollar radars) of all major American military bases in the Persian Gulf. In essence US Navy and Air Force have been kicked out of the Persian Gulf. For example, if a US Aegis missile destroyer needs to replenish, they now have to travel for days back and forth to Diego Garcia!…
- The loss of 3 F-15s, very likely one by evemy fire…
- The attacks on the American navy ships – many denied but otherwise likely certain considering what happened against the “goat herders”, the Houthis, last year, when the US Navy was forced to suddenly abandon the Red Sea.
- The heavy attacks on Israel, proven by numerous videos, despite a censorship system that would make the Soviet Union blush.
BUT – we cannot ignore the 100% proof of failure, the fact that tomorrow, Friday, for the second time in the last few months, the executives of the Defence Industry will meet at the White House. Why? To explain AGAIN, why America has run out of munitions – and to provide solutions!!.
In this climate of utter desperation, new questions are emerging about the strategic desperation inside the U.S.–Israeli camp. According to retired U.S. Army Colonel and former State Department official Lawrence Wilkerson, the conflict may be drawing in actors far beyond the immediate battlefield—including Turkey. Wilkerson, who served as chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, recently argued that Ankara is not truly “outside” the current war dynamics and may already be deeply entangled in the regional power struggle.
In a recent interview, Wilkerson suggested that there may even have been a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in which Netanyahu allegedly attempted to persuade Turkey to align strategically with Israel against Iran. In Wilkerson’s telling, Netanyahu presented a sweeping geopolitical pitch: a partnership that would give Turkey access to Israel’s technological and economic capabilities—especially in advanced sectors such as AI and energy—while positioning both countries as dominant powers in a new Mediterranean geopolitical order.
But the proposal would collide with Turkey’s own strategic anxieties. Ankara has long feared the arming of Kurdish groups along its borders, and any attempt to weaponize Kurdish militancy in the region could quickly destabilize Turkey itself. For Erdogan, this creates a dilemma: the temptation of technological and strategic partnership on one side, and the threat of regional chaos and Kurdish insurgency on the other.
Wilkerson’s conclusion is stark: whether through diplomatic pressure, covert operations, or shifting alliances, Turkey is already being pulled into the conflict’s orbit. The question now is not whether Ankara will be affected—but how it will respond as the regional confrontation widens.
My personal note: If this meeting/interaction between Netanyahu and Erdogan is verified, I would give anything to be a fly on Mitsotakis’ office walls… Or any other Greek politician’s office. After having mobilized the Greek Navy and Air Force to protect “Cyprus” (READ: the British sovereign bases and the American fighter jets hiding there), how does the “cold shower” by Bibi feel?)
Here is the full interview, followed by a summary and bullet-point highlights…
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BELOW A SUMMARY OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE VIDEO
Wilkerson’s core frame: the U.S. (and Israel) don’t understand the “nature of the conflict.”
He says U.S. officials are treating the war like a short, controllable campaign, but Iran is a large, old, resilient society that will absorb punishment and continue fighting.
He argues policy-makers are not matching ends/means, and are ignoring how the conflict can escalate regionally and globally.
He adds “new variables” beyond his earlier list
In addition to Russia/China decisions, munitions stocks, Iranian resilience, effects on energy infrastructure, Bab al-Mandab / Hormuz chokepoints, and U.S. public reaction, he now emphasizes:
escalation pathways (regional → global),
the political objectives of Netanyahu (in his view),
and the mismatch between rhetoric (“we have unlimited weapons”) and real capacity/logistics.
He presents himself as a planner with long exposure to Iran/Gulf war contingencies
He recounts U.S. involvement around the Iran–Iraq War era and Persian Gulf naval incidents to argue he’s familiar with terrain, geography, and what sustained conflict there looks like.
His interpretation of Netanyahu’s objective: “chaos,” not a stable replacement regime
Wilkerson claims the war is being fought “for” Netanyahu and that Netanyahu’s strategic aim is destabilization across the region rather than installing a workable government in Tehran.
He extends this to a broader Israeli maximalist project in the Levant and beyond, arguing it continues even after Netanyahu.
Turkey is not “outside”; it’s already implicated
He says Turkey may publicly distance itself, but is already deeply concerned—especially about Kurds being armed and the spillover risk into Turkey.
He suggests Turkey is monitoring closely with assets “on the ground” reporting back.
His warning about “preparing the battlefield” around Turkey
He alleges Israeli intelligence assets operating in places like Cyprus/southern Greece are part of a wider preparation for future conflict with Turkey—presented as an indicator Israel’s ambitions could eventually collide with Ankara’s interests.
What he says he’d advise as CJCS: don’t start the war
He frames the “right” planning answer as: avoid using the military instrument this way in the region.
He cites practical failures and risks, including noncombatant evacuation preparation and the danger to U.S. forces/bases and naval units.
Munitions/logistics constraints are central
He argues the U.S. lacks key munitions (especially air defense interceptors) and is already cannibalizing allied defenses (e.g., discussion of shifting Patriots/THAAD from other theaters).
He emphasizes that pulling defensive systems from an ally signals unreliability and accelerates allied drift (he predicts South Korea could leave the alliance within ~24 months).
Energy shock and chokepoints as the true “globalizing” mechanism
He stresses Strait of Hormuz / Bab al-Mandab disruption risk, with particular vulnerability for import-dependent states like India.
He describes prior simulations where price spikes (up to ~$200/barrel in his telling) caused shipping/insurance breakdowns, and he expects today’s world to be less cooperative.
Nuclear dimension
He claims Israel has been moving nuclear weapons and that Netanyahu would not hesitate to use them.
He highlights what he sees as the strategic lesson being taught: non-nuclear states are vulnerable; nuclear-armed pariahs (e.g., North Korea) are harder to attack.
Ground invasion talk is “fantasy”
He argues Iran’s size/terrain/population make any occupation unrealistic; even very large deployments would be swallowed by insurgency/attrition.
He uses WWII-scale comparisons to argue the U.S. does not have the manpower or domestic political tolerance.
Kurds as an accelerant—and a trap
He sees arming Kurdish groups as:
a major provocation to Turkey,
historically unreliable for the U.S. (promised then abandoned),
and dangerous because some Kurdish factions may act recklessly once armed.
He suggests Iran anticipated irregular-border warfare and sought capabilities (e.g., attack helicopters) suited to counter-infiltration.
Narrative incoherence and domestic legitimacy problems
He argues U.S. officials can’t keep a consistent justification (imminent threat, self-defense, “helping protesters,” etc.).
He contrasts this with Iraq’s more unified (if false) narrative machine.
He links confusion to weak public support (he cites polling under ~30%).
He introduces a domestic U.S. political–military concern
He claims senior defense leadership is being reshaped to ensure loyalty in a future internal political crisis (January 6 “again”), and that war stress could become a pretext for extraordinary domestic measures.
Great-power context: chaos helps Russia/China (even if not centrally orchestrated)
He’s ambivalent about a fully deliberate “great game,” but argues Washington’s actions create chaos from which Moscow and Beijing can benefit.
He warns that if China/Russia choose to engage militarily, submarine warfare in the region could be catastrophic for U.S. naval forces.
Expanded: the Netanyahu–Erdogan interaction (as Wilkerson describes it)
Wilkerson claims there was a meeting where Netanyahu tried to “sell” Erdogan on alignment with Israel.
He portrays Netanyahu’s pitch as essentially: partner with Israel and you gain access to superior technology, AI skills, energy/finance networks, and leadership of a new Mediterranean order.
The “own the Mediterranean” argument
In Wilkerson’s telling, Netanyahu offers Erdogan a grand bargain: cooperate and you’ll “own the Mediterranean” and more—suggesting a regional bloc led by Israel with Turkey as a beneficiary/partner.
A persuasion strategy aimed at Turkey’s ambitions
He implies Netanyahu targets Erdogan’s desire for Turkish strategic autonomy and status in a multipolar world, offering Israel as the “cutting-edge” partner versus reliance on the U.S.
Wilkerson’s judgment: Erdogan should be too smart for it, but may still be tempted
He says Erdogan is “supposed to be” smarter than to fall for Netanyahu’s pitch, but he’s uncertain Erdogan resists—especially given Ankara’s fears about Kurdish militancy and regional disorder.
How does this tie to Turkey being “already in it”
The interaction matters in his argument because it shows Turkey isn’t a detached bystander:
Israel can pressure Turkey indirectly via Kurdish dynamics,
and can also try to co-opt Turkey through offers of technological/economic partnership and a revised Mediterranean order.
In short: Turkey faces a squeeze—co-optation on one side, destabilization risks on the other.
March 5, 2026, n.stamatakis@aol.com www.helleniscope.com
DISCLAIMER: The views and statements expressed in this article constitute constitutionally protected opinions of this author.
