EDITOR’S NOTE (Nick Stamatakis). I have been listening for several years to our lobbyists and to various “leaders” supporting the idea of expelling China from Piraeus, resonating the fallacious statements coming out of the State Department and the “Deep State”. First of all, this idea is directly conflicting with Greek interests, and no Greek American organizations should support it. Did you ever hear the Israeli Lobby (AIPAC, and others) stating that China should be kicked out of the port of Haifa (also controlled by a Chinese company, SIPG)? No, of course not, because Israel’s interests suggest clearly that China has to be given access, along with other international trading partners. But our “American-Greeks” completely ignore Greece’s vital interests. After all, Greek shipowners control 20% of the world’s shipping, and such a decision directly affects their business.
Particularly aggressive – and very negative for the interests of Greece – are the statements by Ambassador Kimberly Guilfoyle. Almost daily, “she ups the ante”, seeking more and more, “kicking China out of Greece”… Yes, Greece is aligned with the “maritime” power (as it has always been – starting with Britain), but its interests suggest openness of its ports to all and business with all. Greek shipowners stated it best when they were accused of helping Russia in recent years: “We are the taxi drivers of the oceans, and we take whoever can pay the fare!!”
Will some Greek patriotic politicians please allow a “Shipowners Board” in a permanent advisory position at the Greek Foreign Ministry?
These are delusional plans as delusional as selling American LNG at 4x the cost to Greece and Eastern Europe – a plan that is guaranteed to impoverish any country that imports it exclusively. To achieve the delusional idea, Ambassador Guilfoyle has been supporting the American-led investment in the port of Elefsis, a few miles west of Piraeus. I wouldn’t mind this plan at all, except that I have seen evidence that the American and Greek corporations involved in the Elefsis port are heavily in debt, and are insolvent and delusional. This, in essence, turns the scheme into nothing more than a grift for some “executives” and others associated with them… Instead of long-term planning, American policymakers prefer, once again, short-term gain…. China plays chess, and the US plays poker… And it has not many cards – to imitate Trump.
You will read much information in the new article by The Economist below. But you will not see that this “bright idea” is based mostly on the “India-Middle East-Europe” Corridor (IMEC). The only “little” problem is that China exports 10 times as much cargo as India!! Yes, you read correctly: 10 times more!! In other words, the Chinese-controlled Port of Piraeus is bound to handle at least ten times more cargo…
Which leaves us once again with the only option the “Empire” is left with: to impose its hegemony by force, as it did recently in Panama. The only problem is that China controls 67% of Piraeus under a long-term contract that runs until 1952!! Only a global war will manage to destroy this contract – a war America in its current state of affairs cannot win.
Until the US establishment realizes that it has to operate in a multipolar world, and in such a world, they will have a great chance for the prosperity of the American people (but not hegemony), only then can they lead this beautiful country back on the road to success… But first, they have to realize that success is not drinking the blood of every other nation on the planet unpunished.
PS. On the opposite, in shipbuilding, Greece and the US, cooperating in a rational, non-exploitative but business-like manner, have a bright future: Greece has probably the BEST ship-building engineering school in the world in Athens Polytechnic (EMP), and America has largely lost its capacity to build ships, especially warships, but it has the design technology. An excellent start is already in place and needs to be expanded. There is absolutely no reason for many Greek shipping engineers to work in China, South Korea, or Japan…
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The global scramble for ports
The investment frenzy is driven by anxiety about China’s tightening grip on supply chains
Some 1,200 kilometers north of Egypt’s Suez Canal lies the Port of Piraeus on the coast of Greece. The country possesses more shipping capacity than any other, and the port, majority-owned by COSCO, a Chinese state-owned firm, is one of Europe’s busiest, with more than 4 million containers moving through it every year.
Just 30km west, the American government is backing a bid to develop a commercial port at Elefsina. About 500km to the north, Russian and Chinese investors have taken a stake in the Port of Thessaloniki. And further north-east, American and NATO forces have built a logistics hub at the Port of Alexandroupolis.
The scramble for ports in Greece is part of a global contest to control the plumbing of maritime trade, from Argentina to Thailand. In some places, like the Panama Canal, the competition has taken a nasty turn, part of a geostrategic battle between America and China. In others, multiple countries and firms are vying for port and logistics deals as geopolitical insurance, as a business proposition—or both. In sum, spending on port infrastructure will rise by more than a third to $90bn annually by 2035, says PwC, a consultancy.
About 80% of the world’s trade by volume travels by sea. Governments naturally worry about keeping goods moving. A series of crises in recent years, from the covid-19 pandemic to the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has shown how easily the global trading system can be thrown into chaos. The desire to reduce dependence on particular chokepoints for both commercial and geopolitical reasons is only natural. And in the long run more competition between ports probably means lower shipping costs.
Yet the rush to build port infrastructure is likely to result in huge inefficiencies (see chart). Many investors, including both American and Chinese taxpayers, will see disappointing returns. And political pressure for shipping firms to use particular ports and sea routes, in defiance of all commercial logic, is bound to grow.
As with so many modern geopolitical contests, this one has been driven by anxiety about China’s ambitions and its tightening hold on global supply chains. Chinese firms now operate or have a financial stake in at least 129 ports outside China (see map), and have spent at least $80bn on port construction from Antigua to Tanzania, with many of the investments tied to bilateral trade and regional shipping agreements.
Terminal ferocity
More than a third of China’s overseas ports are near maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, making them indispensable operators in strategic areas.
China’s firm grip on global ports has rattled Western governments. MERICS, a think-tank in Berlin, found that after a terminal operating contract is signed, total trade with China rises by more than a fifth, while countries that allow Chinese firms to run all their terminals at one of their ports see a 19% drop in exports to the rest of the world. Operating ports allowed Chinese firms to prioritise their cargo and vessels and speed up customs and logistics.
Non-Chinese shipping companies have been rapidly beefing up their own networks. Since 2021 such firms have announced about $140bn of acquisitions in various parts of the maritime supply chain. Hapag-Lloyd, a German shipping giant, signed a deal in January to acquire 50% of a container-terminal operator in Brazil; more recently it raised its stake in JM Baxi Ports, an Indian firm, and announced plans to acquire ZIM, an Israeli shipping line.
In January Stonepeak, an American investment firm, formed a $10bn joint-venture, United Ports, with CMA-CGM. And in February APM Terminals, a subsidiary of AP Moller-Maersk, a shipping giant, and Eurogate, a container-handling firm, announced a plan to invest €1bn ($1.2bn) to expand a terminal in the North Sea.
Governments are also paving the way for their country’s firms to secure maritime routes and berths. India is in the midst of a vast port-building effort that is expected to continue until 2047; in October Saudi Arabia signed a $450m deal for the Jeddah Islamic Port. Singapore is building a $20bn automated port and shipping hub. DP World, Dubai’s port company, has signed deals to invest and expand its positions at ports in Dar es Salaam and Callao in Peru.
Many investments are taking place alongside Chinese ones without directly threatening China’s interests. But America has taken a more antagonistic approach.
Take its battle for control of the Panama Canal. After his election in 2024 Donald Trump said the operation of two ports at the canal by CK Hutchison, a Hong Kong conglomerate, posed a threat to American interests. During his inaugural address last year Mr Trump threatened to take “back” control of the canal, which America built in the early 20th century and which handles around 40% of America’s cargo, equivalent to about 5% of global sea trade annually, or $270bn.
BlackRock, an American asset manager, and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), the biggest ocean-going carrier, then stepped in to buy Hutchison’s non-Chinese ports, including its two Panama Canal terminals, in a $23bn deal that angered the bigwigs in Beijing. In February, Panamanian authorities handed temporary operation of the terminals to Maersk and MSC after the country’s top court ruled that CK Hutchison’s contracts were unconstitutional. China detained dozens of Panama-flagged ships in retaliation and told Maersk and MSC to cease operations at the Panama port. Hutchison has sued Panama for billions; the long-term management of the port remains in question.
Seas the means of production
Elsewhere America’s Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is stepping up its efforts to protect the country’s shipping. “If US cargo has an interest in that area and is at risk, we can take action,” says Laura DiBella, the chairwoman of the FMC. “We have some serious teeth,” she adds, including sanctions, tariffs and fines. Ms DiBella says America should be “paying attention to our backyard more” and that the FMC is watching for “anti-competitive” behaviour at ports. Officials are keeping a close eye on ports in Latin America, including Puerto de Chancay in Peru.
Even at ports that are not owned or operated by China, Chinese firms are deeply embedded in port supply chains. Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, a Chinese state-backed firm, makes more than 70% of ship-to-shore cranes, large and mostly automated machines which unload and stack containers. Chinese companies also make 95% of shipping containers used for the moving of goods.
China’s reach extends beyond physical infrastructure. LOGINK, a Chinese government-run logistics-management software, is used in at least 24 countries and 86 ports (America banned its use in 2023). LOGINK shares data with CargoSmart, another shipping-management software firm owned by COSCO, and in turn gives it access to the whereabouts of 90% of the world’s container ships. It also has a tie-up with CaiNiao, a logistics provider with hundreds of warehouses around the world.
And Chinese firms will keep expanding overseas in response to the surge from competitors. “The intensifying international geopolitical competition has profoundly affected our industry,” Zhu Tao, chairman of COSCO, said in March. “Expanding our port footprint remains a critical response.” The firm plans to invest more in Piraeus and Abu Dhabi. China Merchants Port, another large Chinese firm, is in the process of acquiring Vast Infrastructure, a Brazilian port operator. Chinese firms are also building industrial parks and manufacturing facilities close to their existing ports in Africa and Europe.
All this jockeying has led to a nascent bifurcation of networks of Chinese and Western-owned ports. That will generate some long-term benefits for all shippers: ports can no longer behave as monopolies and charge what they want; they will have to give shippers better service, at better rates. Operators will need to reinvest in costly services like port dredging so big vessels can enter, and maintain better upkeep so they aren’t replaced. “There is always an unhappy customer at a big port,” says one executive. Having another port nearby will give them options.
But at least some of the builders (and the taxpayers who finance them) will be losers. India’s ambitious plans are at risk because the country is bracketed by major ports in Singapore and Salalah (in Oman). And its own ports risk cannibalising each other, a terminal executive points out.
“Every port, every country wants to be a logistics hub, and they all can’t be that,” says an executive at a European maritime firm. Since an expansion of Tanger Med, a Moroccan port in the Strait of Gibraltar, in 2019, volumes at the nearby Port of Algeciras in Spain have struggled to grow.
A duplicative network of ports will also come with higher fixed costs. That risks saddling shippers with more debt-laden operations, potentially inefficient sea routes and some risk of ending up on the wrong side of one or another country’s geopolitical interests. In times of disruption, like now, consumers may be hit with higher prices and delays despite the overall increase in shipping capacity.
Still, port duplication is not all bad. The ports under development in Greece serve different, if slightly overlapping, markets. And ports have some room for inefficiency. Historically ports have commanded hefty operating margins of, on average, more than 40%, and those margins have ticked up over the past decade. As countries and firms begin to compete more for volume, their returns will be lower. That is probably not the prize they were seeking when they launched the port wars. ■
