EDITOR’S NOTE (Nick Stamatakis). Kapodistrias never accepted the idea of an”autonomous” Greece paying tribute to the Sultan. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1827-28, which turned out to be a disaster for the Turks who had come just 30 miles outside Constantinople, he used all his experience in the Russian Foreign Ministry and manipulated the Great Powers to win independence for Greece. Says the author, Admiral Chenofotis: Ioannis Kapodistrias always kept in mind this characterization of Navarino as an “unfortunate event.”
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source – estianews.gr/defencepoint.gr
By Admiral (ret.) P. Chenofotis
The Greek naval commanders focused naval operations on supporting the geographical center of the Revolution, the Peloponnese—where all major fortresses (except Tripoli) were coastal—as well as defending the islands and maintaining sea communications.
The burning of the Ottoman flagship at Chios, the naval battles of Eresos, Patras, Tenedos, Samos, Gerontas, Heraklion, Methoni, the raid on Egypt by Tombazis, Kriezis, Kanaris, Vokos, and Boutis, and the unprecedented naval feat of the breakout of the ship Ares (26 April 1825)—breaking through a blockade of 44 Ottoman ships and sinking 7 at Navarino during the siege of Sphacteria—constitute the glory of the naval fighters of 1821.
These brilliant naval achievements, along with the struggles on land, awakened the Concert of the Great Powers (Britain, Austria, France, Russia, Prussia, 1818) and the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, Prussia, 1815), due to the evident threat to their geopolitical interests posed by the impending formation of a fully independent and naval-capable Greek state.
Their dominant aim—especially that of Russia—was a subordinate autonomy of Greece under the Sultan, without power or influence. In January 1824, Russia proposed a plan for autonomous principalities modeled on Moldavia and Wallachia.
For the British, supporting the Ottomans, preventing a Russo-Turkish war, and limiting Russian influence were served by the signing of the Protocol of St. Petersburg (1826), envisioning a small Greek state (Peloponnese, Attica, Western Cyclades), autonomous but tributary to the Sultan.
The Treaty of London (1827) reaffirmed subordination to the Sultan but included a secret clause for mediation and instructions to fleet commanders to avoid hostilities.
These developments, along with diplomatic pressure on the Ottoman fleet, culminated in the Battle of Navarino (20 October 1827), which resulted in the destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet.
A characteristic excerpt from the speech of George IV (29 January 1828) described Navarino as an “untoward/unfortunate event,” a view strongly supported by Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington.
Ioannis Kapodistrias always kept in mind this characterization of Navarino as an “unfortunate event.” He never rested under the imposed solution of subordinate autonomy by the Great Powers and, despite difficulties, did not lose heart. He accomplished his crucial national work “with the highest national feeling, patriotism, and self-sacrifice.”
“The first Governor of the Greek State, the virtuous and distinguished Ioannis Kapodistrias, seized the opportunity for full independence with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829), through which the Greek question was resolved. No Power had previously spoken of complete independence for Greece.”
The naval fighters, the land fighters of the Revolution, the Greek clergy, and the national leader Kapodistrias together reflect the crown of the national rebirth.
The author correctly frames this monumental sacrifice as the “great” powers viewing the Greek struggle for freedom through the prism of self-interest, not to help Greece except that Russia is a reluctant and dissident player in these machinations. The claim that Russia’s aim was “a subordinate autonomy of Greece under the Sultan, without power or influence” is misleading. It treats Russia’s 1824 proposal for limited Greek autonomy as a fixed and hostile objective, when in reality it was a TEMPORARY diplomatic compromise shaped by European power politics. While Russia did initially favor an AUTONOMOUS arrangement under Ottoman suzerainty, this did not imply a desire to leave Greece “without power or influence,” nor did it reflect its LONG TERM aims, which evolved toward supporting greater independence as circumstances changed. Russia’s long series of wars OVER CENTURIES against the Ottoman TURK Empire cannot be understood as mere acts of national preservation or strategic rivalry. As a self-proclaimed protector of Orthodox Christianity, Russia consistently framed its expansion and intervention in explicitly religious and civilizational terms, particularly in relation to Orthodox populations under Ottoman rule. Its involvement in the Greek struggle was not simply geopolitical—it was rooted in a shared religious identity that elevated the Greek cause above that of other subject peoples within the Empire. Had Greece been a predominantly Muslim society, Russia would have had neither the ideological justification nor the same political incentive to intervene so persistently or decisively. This underscores that religious solidarity was not incidental, but central, to Russian policy in the Eastern Question. Later events confirm the duplicity of Britain for example the Crimean War whose main aim was preserving the Ottoman Empire.
Excellent points – although Metternich’s influence on the Czar is well documented…